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ABSTRACT: In some cases, there appears to be an asymmetry in the evidential value of statistical and more
individualized evidence. For example, while Imay accept that Alex is guilty based on eyewitness testimony that
is 80% likely to be accurate, it does not seem permissible to do so based on the fact that 80% of a group that Alex
is a member of are guilty. In this paper I suggest that rather than reflecting a deep defect in statistical evidence,
this asymmetry might arise from a general constraint on rational inquiry. Plausibly the degree of evidential
support needed to justify taking a proposition to be true depends on the stakes of error. While relying on
statistical evidence plausibly raises the stakes by introducing new kinds of risk to members of the reference
class, paradigmatically ‘individualized’ evidence—evidence tracing back to A’s voluntary behavior—can lower
the stakes. The net result explains the apparent evidential asymmetry without positing a deep difference in the
brute justificatory power of different types of evidence.
1 The Asymmetry
Here’s a simple picture: something is evidence for p just if it raises the epistemic probability that p, and the
strength of evidence— its power to justify epistemic actions like inference, belief, etc.—can be read directly off
of these probabilities: e1 is stronger evidence for p than e2 iff the probability of p given e1 is greater than the
probability of p given e2. Let’s call this simple-probabilism. This picture does not distinguish between statistical
information and direct observation when thinking about their power to ground inferences. But sometimes there
is an apparent asymmetry in their justificatory power; for example, consider two cases:
(a) Prison Yard-a1 – One hundred prisoners exercise in the prison yard. Ninety-five prisoners together assault a guard.
Security footage reveals five prisoners standing against the wall refusing to participate, but is too grainy to identify
them. The guard cannot identify his assailants. Alex is prosecuted for the assault, on the grounds that we know he
was one of the prisoners in the yard, and therefore we can be 95% confident that he participated in the assault.
(b) Prison Yard-b –One prisoner attacks a guard, and there’s an eyewitness whomwe know to be accurate under similar
conditions 85% of the time. Alex is prosecuted on the grounds that the eyewitness testifies that Alex was the assailant.
Let p be the proposition that ‘Alex participated in the assault’. The following three judgments seem true:
1. The evidence in the (a) case renders pmore probable than the evidence in the (b) case.
2. In the (a) case, our evidence does not suffice to establish p.
3. In the (b) case, our evidence does suffice to establish p.
This puzzling trio of judgments is an instance of the statistical evidence proof paradox.2 Given simple-probabilism,
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(1) implies that the evidence for p in the (a) case is stronger than in the (b) case, but (2) and (3) jointly seem to
imply the opposite.
Some take this puzzle to motivate a position I’ll call statistics-deficiency: when e is statistical evidence,
it may be able to contribute to an agent’s rational credence in p, but it cannot justify all-out attitudes like full
belief, constitute knowledge, or license the agent to assert or issue a judgment that p.3 That is, that (1)-(3) are all
true, because there is a justificatory asymmetry between statistical evidence and other kinds of evidence due to a
particular defect in statistical evidence. The canonical source for this skeptical stance toward statistical evidence
is Laurence Tribe (1971), who included all explicitly probabilistic evidence in the scope of his criticisms.4
Advocates of the statistics-deficiency have offered a wide range of explanations for it.5 Colyvan, Re-
gan, and Ferson (2001) stress the difficulty of establishing an appropriate reference class, as well as the tenuous
connection between statistical evidence and the agency of the subject of the trial. They consequently praise
Judge Newman for vacating a sentence (in United States v. Shonubi)6 that had been based partially on statistical
evidence, on the grounds that “it did not constitute specific evidence’.
Though it is widely held, not everyone shares this view. Peter Tillers (2005) is sharply critical of both Judge
Newman and Colyvan, Regan, & Ferson’s discussion of the case. He levels two main objections. First, that “the
attempted distinction between specific and non-specific evidence is almost unintelligible” (Tillers, 2005, 36),
and so the requirement that evidence be specific would preclude all group-to-individual inference, including
inferences from the person’s own past behavior. Second, that the exclusion of statistical evidence was improperly
justified, because it “is best explained or justified by considerations of justice or social policy rather than by
epistemic, inferential, or statistical principles”. He contends that it is inescapable that individuals will be saddled
with “a vast multitude of evidentiary signs that are generated by the cosmos and other people, rather than by the
individuals about whom the inferences are to be made” and thus the specific evidence requirement is wishful
3Buchak (2014); Jackson (2018) deny that evidence couched in statistical terms can justify full belief; Moss (2018) deny that it grounds
knowledge; Thomson (1986) holds that it does not license assertion.
4Tribe is clear that his objection to statistical evidence is not simply that it is probabilistic in nature, rather than delivering certainties: “I am,
of course, aware that all factual evidence is ultimately ”statistical,” and all legal proof ultimately “probabilistic,” in the epistemological sense
that no conclusion can ever be drawn from empirical data without some step of inductive inference”. . .My concern, however, is only with
types of evidence and modes of proof that bring this probabilistic element of inference to explicit attention in a quantified way.” (Tribe,
1971, 1330, fn 2)
5As a representative sampling: Enoch, Spectre, and Fisher (2012) argue that evidence must be sensitive: for e to justify belief in p, it must
be that if p weren’t the case, we wouldn’t have e. This is a modal notion, and evidence is stronger the larger the range of possible worlds
in which this counterfactual holds. Statistical evidence often fails this constraint, since the generalization will hold even if the particular
individual on trial doesn’t have the property in question (though not always; see criticisms in Blome-Tillmann (2015), Littlejohn (2017)
and Gardiner (2018)). Pritchard (2017) argues that evidence must be safe, rather than risky: for e to justify belief in p, it must not be easily
consistent with ¬p. Roughly, given that we have e, it must be true that p in all the nearby possible worlds. Smith (2017a, 2017b) holds
that evidence must provide normic support for the proposition it justifies, which e does for p just if, given that e is true, if p fails to be
true we’ll need some explanation to reconcile the two facts; it’s not normal, in an important sense, for e to be consistent with ¬P. Risinger
(2004, 2018)’s ‘surprise’ theory, on which e is good evidence for p if, given e, we would be surprised to learn that p is false, can be read as a
variant of the normic support model as well. Haack (2012) (as well as Brennan-Marquez (2017) and others) suggest that evidential strength
amounts to explanatory power and coherence, whereas statistical generalizations typically speak to probabilities without explaining why
they should hold, and so are relatively weak evidence.
6103 F.3d 1085 (2d Circuit, 1997)
Explaining Evidential Asymmetries 3
thinking, driven by “amoral yearning for perfectly equitable and just evidence and inference”—but wishing can’t
make it so.
I’ll largely set aside the challenge of articulating what, precisely, the requirement that evidence be ‘specific’
or ‘individualized’ amounts to, in order to focus on the second half of Tillers’ complaint. I will argue that there
is a straightforwardly epistemic reason to think that statistical evidence will generally have little probative value,
and so be less valuable than other sorts of evidence. Additionally, there is an appropriate role for political or
distributive considerations to justify the exclusion of certain forms of statistical evidence, even if it is impossible
to limit our inferences to just the individual’s own behavior. Even to pursue this more limited goal, we’ll need
some idea of what the difference is between statistical evidence and other forms.
Both individualized and statistical evidence can be merely probabilistic. The distinctive feature of statistical
evidence is that it leverages population-level generalities in very particular ways—but there are two variations
we should distinguish from each other. The first, Statistical Inference, is inductive: it uses data gleaned from an
observed sample to build a statistical model in order to estimate frequencies in a target population, butmakes no
claims about specific individuals within them.7 The second, Actuarial Inference, is a broadly deductive method
for using information about population-level frequencies to set your degree of confidence in claims about an
individual member of that population. As a first step, it assumes that your credence in an arbitrary member of
G’s having a property F should match the population-level frequency of having F among G-members. Then it
advises that, in the absence of better information about a particular member a of G, your confidence that a has
F (which I’ll abbreviate Fa) should match the probability of Fx for an arbitrary x inG. This form of reasoning
is also called direct inference, and it is this that underwrites the inference in prison yard a.
These two methods raise slightly different questions. It is relatively easy to distinguish model-based statis-
tical inference from other forms of reasoning, and to explain why the epistemic justification it yields might be
fragile and constrained. There are a host of questions we should ask about the adequacy of the model, the rep-
resentativeness of the sample population, the accuracy of the measure for the target property, the power of the
test to detect the measured property, etc. But the main arguments against using ‘statistical evidence’ — includ-
ing Tribe (1971)’s own original complaint — do not raise concerns about any of these issues. They are content
to assume that the statistical inferences are correct, and the resulting estimates are reliable, even reflecting the
true frequency of the trait in the target population. Forbidding reliance on statistical inference will not secure
the prescription critics of statistical evidence take their arguments to establish, namely that (as Duff, 1998, puts
it) when judging a person’s guilt, “we must rely only on evidence related to him as an individual agent, not on
evidence related to him only as a member of an actuarial group.” The central question concerns only the actu-
arial inferences: if we discover thatG has a higher than average rate of Fness, what follows from knowing that a
belongs toG? Is it evidence that Fa?
There is an intuitive difference between actuarial inference and ‘specific’ evidence, roughly tracking the dif-
ference between particular observations and broad generalizations, but it doesn’t hold up well under scrutiny.
As Schauer (2003, 103) points out, “even the processes that initially appear to us to be ‘direct,’ ‘actual,’ or in-
dividualized turn out to rely far more on generalizations from past experience than is often appreciated.” The
7Importantly, this mode of inference makes predictions about the distributive properties of a trait or event in a population, within certain
confidence intervals; it does not make claims about the properties of specific individual members.
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inferences that allow us to leverage observations about someone’s appearance or behavior to draw conclusions
about criminality rely on generalizations (e.g. ‘most of the time someone weaving between lanes in such a way
is intoxicated’) as a suppressed premise. Consider eye-witness testimony, a form of paradigmatically individ-
ualized evidence. A witness asserts that she saw someone with salient features in common with the defendant
(height, weight, hair color, perhaps driving a car that looks like one owned by the defendant, etc.) at the scene
around the time of the crime. Since it’s unlikely that she saw someone who had all those properties and was not
the defendant, we conclude that the witness saw the defendant. But this final bit of reasoning is what makes the
eyewitness’s testimony evidence about the defendant. When this premise is made explicit, as it was in People v.
Collins,8 it is readily recognized and dismissed as statistical. So, the difference cannot be whether the evidence
depends on a generalization at any point.
In the absence of a consistent, principled articulation of the division, proposals to exclude statistical evidence
are vulnerable to the charge that they are at best just an ad hoc collection of specific prohibitions, which are
not epistemically motivated. So even once we’ve narrowed the scope of the complaint from being against all
probabilistic inferences to only an objection to actuarial inference, we still owe an answer to the challenge: why
exclude any evidence that might bear on our inquiry? Won’t we be more accurate in each particular case if we
allow ourselves to draw on all the relevant information, statistical or not? Sometimes the generalizations will
associate various forms of criminality with protected classes, and this may seem unfair or unjust, but if we bar
reliance on those grounds, isn’t this—as Tillers says—simply allowing our moral discomfort with the truths to
lead us to engage in wishful thinking?
2 Explaining the Asymmetry
This is a question which can be posed at the individual level as well as the institutional. I have discussed why it
is rationally impermissible for individuals to rely on particular generalizations in earlier work (Bolinger, 2018);
this paper extends the analysis to institutional contexts. I contend that the apparent justificatory asymmetry is
both real and grounded in properly epistemic considerations.
The general formofmy argument is this: the nature and aims of rational deliberation generate a constraint on
inquiry that is especially difficult for actuarial information to satisfy. As a consequence, the amount of evidential
support needed clear the justificatory threshold for closing inquiry, when relying on actuarial inference alone,
can be a good deal higher than when basing a judgment on other forms of evidence. This explains the observed
justificatory asymmetry. In closing, I’ll suggest that given its low epistemic value, and the social and moral costs
of having a policy that allows the use of actuarial evidence, we have most reason to exclude reliance on these
forms of evidence as a matter of public policy.
2.1 rational settling
All sorts of inquirers—not just individuals, but fact-finding bodies, and legal courts—can be epistemic agents. In
a trial, the finder of fact aims to determine whether there is sufficient evidence to establish a specific proposition,
namely, that the defendant is guilty (or liable), so that they can decide whether to sentence or acquit. We can get
insight into the rational constraints on this institutional inquiry by paying careful attention to the structure of
rational inquiry in the abstract, borrowing a bit from formal epistemology.
868 Cal.2d 319, 66 Cal.Rptr. 497 (1968)
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An ideal epistemic agent represents all the possible ways the world might be, given their evidence, in a
theoretical construct called a state space. The intersections of propositions define regions of the space, and
the rational agent assigns each region a degree of confidence according to its probability of being true given
their evidence. An ideal and unlimited agent should only represent certainties as true throughout the space
(receiving credence 1), and only their negations as false (credence 0). Anything that could possibly be false (but
is not certainly so), on her evidence, should receive a credence greater than 0 and less than 1. When such an
agent deliberates about what to do, they should weight the possible outcomes of the actions they consider by
their relative credence in each possibility, and then follow an appropriate decision rule.9 Since a full state space
forms a complete partition of logical space—every evidentially possible scenario receives some positive non-
zero credence—the number of possibilities represented and considered in this way will be vast.10 But that is no
problem for an idealized agent with limitless epistemic resources.
Of course real agents, whether individual or institutional, have limited epistemic resources, and some pos-
sibilities are of greater consequence than others. Since a cognitively bounded agent can track only a small finite
number of possibilities, they must focus on the ones that make a difference to how it is rational for them to
act. So, even if her maximally careful credences in any possibility remain as represented in the full statespace, a
rational but limited agent will have to work with a simplified space, which I’ll call the active frame, representing
only the propositions of interest, when deliberating about what to do. Several propositions that are not logical
truths—and in which the agent’s degree of confidence, given their evidence, is noticeably less than 1—will be
simply taken for granted in the active frame. If p is one of these propositions, all of the regions of the frame will
assume that p holds. The frame needn’t explicitly represent p as true; it just won’t have a region representing
the possibility that ¬p. I will say that such a proposition is settled. To settle that p is to consider the question of
whether p closed: to stop actively seeking evidence bearing on it, stop worrying about the risks associated with
the possibility that ¬p when deciding how to act, etc. It does not necessarily involve becoming certain in p.
The difference between keeping track of a proposition and settling it shows up when the bounded rational
agent deliberates about what they should do. If they’re keeping track of whether p in their active frame, then
when they face a p-dependent decision, they’ll draw up a decision table comparing the outcomes of each alter-
native under the assumption that p is true with their outcomes under the assumption that ¬p. Then, using that
information as an input, they’ll select the option that fares best according to their preferred decision rule for
risky tradeoffs (e.g., maximize expected utility). By contrast, if they’ve already settled that p, they’ll just operate
under the assumption that p when selecting their action; they’ll never draw up a column for the possibility that
¬p.11 Legal findings of fact and judgments of guilt are not hedged bets; rather, they are institutional correlates
9The question of which decision rules might be appropriate to legal judgments will take us too far afield, so I set it aside.
10Such a partition may well represent as possible propositions that are, in fact, logical impossibilities; an agent whose evidence does not
establish a particular identity fact (e.g. a=b) will have various logical impossibilities (including a ̸=b) in her logical state space. We will
want to say something similar for logical theorems that are difficult to recognize, or conjectures that if true, are necessarily true, but
accommodating these presents a more difficult technical challenge, which I will set aside for this paper.
11I of course do not mean to suggest that real agents pause to literally draw up decision tables when deliberating. Some people do, but I take
it that most instead employ heuristics that roughly approximate this reasoning structure. What I’ve called ‘settling’ maps pretty well onto
an epistemic state variously called ‘acceptance’ (Bolinger, 2018; Bratman, 1992), ‘belief ’ (Ross & Schroeder, 2014), and ‘premising’ (Locke,
2013). Whether this attitude is appropriately called belief in the individual case is a question that divides theorists; I’m not particularly
fussed about what we call it. Our interest is only in the fact that at the institutional level, something structurally like settling that p is a
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of all-out individual states like belief, assertion, or premising. I do not suggest that they are, or even necessarily
directly involve, belief; but simply that they are ways of settling a proposition.
Which propositions are worth tracking changes over time for an agent, as their information, values, and
available actions change.12 In settling that p, the agent moves from a frame that has regions encoding informa-
tion about the evidential probability of ¬p to one that doesn’t; and from a degreed attitude concerning p to a
binary one. Making this transition involves information loss. The main reason to do it is that it simplifies their
reasoning, freeing up epistemic resources for other tasks, including tracking other propositions. But because it
discards their recorded degree of credence in ¬p, it can only be rational when that information doesn’t earn its
keep: when the value of tracking p is not sufficient to justify the epistemic cost of doing so.
The value of tracking p is a function of (i) what difference the remaining uncertainty about pmakes to what
action is most rational for the agent to perform, and (ii) how much they can expect their assessment of p to
change on new evidence. If an agent’s current evidence renders their remaining uncertainty about p irrelevant
to what they should rationally do, they are practically adequate.13 If their evidence grounds a stable credence
that is unlikely to change much as they gather more information, their credence is resilient. Putting all of this
together yields the following as a constraint on rational settling:
Rational SettlingConstraint: It is rationally permissible for an agent S to settle that p on evidence e only when
their credence in p on e is resilient and practically adequate for all their anticipatable p-dependent decisions.
This constraint entails that whether an agent can rationally settle that p on her current evidence cannot be simply
read off the evidential probability of p. The justification for the rational settling constraint arises from consid-
erations about the sort of epistemic process settling is; it is peripheral whether the agent doing the settling is an
individual or an institution, and it does not matter what the subject matter is. So if issuing a legal judgment
is a form of settling, then we should expect it to be governed by this constraint. Despite the initial air of para-
dox around cases like prison yard, if something like the Rational Settling Constraint holds, we shouldn’t be
surprised that we can find case pairs in which whether evidence is sufficient to settle p does not directly track
how probable it makes p. I maintain that the observed asymmetry between the justificatory force of individu-
alized and actuarial evidence is due to the fact that the latter has a harder time satisfying the constraint. More
specifically, the asymmetry arises from two facts:
1. the population-level generalizations underwriting actuarial inference are a less resilient basis for credence
than paradigmatically individualized information, and
2. it is difficult for actuarial evidence to render an agent practically adequate.
Let’s take these one at a time.
prerequisite to issuing a legal judgment that p.
12To formally model such agents, we’ll have to allow for both the introduction of some propositions that aren’t yet in their active frame, and
elimination of some that propositions that are. I won’t pursue the former project here; I am interested only in the constraints on when
agents can discard possibilities from the set they’re keeping track of.
13Anderson andHawthorne (2019) give the following, more technical definition of practical adequacy: “S is practically adequate with respect
to p iff the top-ranked element(s) in S’s actual preference ranking do not differ from the top-ranked element(s) in her ranking conditional
on p.”
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2.2 resilience
Rather than tracking the conditional probability of p on e, or the total amount of evidence amassed, resilience
is a measure of how stable a credence is: how little variance we should expect as the agent acquires additional
evidence. In institutional contexts, it corresponds roughly to some of the ways that legal theorists unpack the
notion of ‘evidential weight’.14 Credences based solely on reference-class based frequencies or population-level
propensities tend not to be very resilient, especially as compared with those based on ‘specific’ or ‘individual-
izing’ evidence. This is because the necessary inferential premise—that p is as likely to be true of the particular
individual before us, Alex, as of any arbitrary member of that class—can easily be disrupted by new evidence.
There are many ways that could happen. One is by learning that Alex is a member of another, plausibly
relevant reference class, with a very different conditional probability for p. We could learn that Alex is a pacifist,
and that only 5%of pacifists ever participate in assaults. Thiswould be new evidence about a competing reference
class, and on learning it, we can no longer simply rely on the probabilities from the ‘prisoners-in-the-yard’ class.15
It’s also possible for population-level correlations to reverse as you look at increasingly specific subsets of the
class. This is nicely illustrated in the 1973 fall admissions for the University of California, Berkeley. At the
university level, the probability of being admitted was much higher for men (44%) than women (35%). But at a
department-level this trend reversed: women were being admitted at a higher rate than men; they were simply
applying in larger numbers to the highly selective departments, while the opposite was true of men.16 Both of
these scenarios involve acquiring actuarial evidence that conflicts with our initial information. But even without
such evidence, credences about any particular individual’s traits are quite fragile when based on a group-level
frequency fact. Any additional evidence we have about Alex that differentiates him from an arbitrary member
of the group will carry more information about him than the population-level generalization did, and so should
have accordingly more influence on our credences.
For these reasons, it is difficult—though not necessarily impossible—for actuarial evidence to satisfy the
resilience requirement of the rational settling constraint.
2.3 practical adequacy
The practical adequacy constraint is slightly more involved. Whether some evidence e renders an agent practi-
cally adequate has a decision-theoretic structure: it’s a function of the evidential probability of p and the stakes
of error for foreseeable p-dependent decisions. Themore costly it would be to mistakenly act on the assumption
that p, the more sure we’ll need to be that p in order to achieve practical adequacy. For legal judgments, the
most salient cost of error is wronging the immediate subject of the trial by treating them as guilty or liable when
they are not.
14Much of the discussion of evidential weight in Cohen (1977, 271) appeals to the importance of the expected stability of one’s credences–
which is resilience. However, as Cohen developed the notion, weight refers to a proportion or amount of total evidence, while resilience is
better understood as how difficult it would be for new evidence to substantially shift one’s credences. Several contemporary proposals for
a comparative plausibility standard of evidential strength (made as part of a general move toward explanationism and away from simple
probabilism are articulated in ways that strongly evoke resilience (see Allen & Pardo, 2019, for a helpful overview and summary of many
of these proposals) .
15This was in fact one of the main weaknesses in statistical evidence that Colyvan et al. (2001) emphasize.
16This phenomenon, Simpson’s Paradox, is one of a family of structurally similar cases known as the ‘ecological fallacies’.
Explaining Evidential Asymmetries 8
Settling that p on actuarial grounds runs a very particular sort of risk: not simply that we will impose the
costs of a false finding onAlex, but that we will do so because of hismembership in the group that forms the basis
of the generalization. I will assume (solely for simplicity) that there is no moral disvalue to imposing this cost
when p is actually true; that the prisoners who participated in the assault are not wronged by facing a higher risk
of being found guilty were they (counterfactually) innocent. Still, actuarial evidence consists in a generalization
about the frequency of a feature of interest in a group defined by a different property, G. Non-homogenous
groups have some group-members of whom p is false, whom we would wrong were we to treat them as if p.
Though only one individual is directly at risk in any given trial, if the property determining membership in the
G-class is relatively stable, then having a policy of taking being G as evidence of p entails that simply being G
increases a person’s odds of being falsely convicted if they are tried.
How serious this cost is will depend on what sort of propertyG is: how difficult it is to avoid, how stable or
visible it is, whether it is chosen, and perhaps how central to autonomy. Individuals have a particularly strong
moral and justice-based complaint against being subjected to heightened risk of false conviction just because of
an unchosen, identity-tracking property (race, height, gender, etc.). They may have a similarly strong complaint
against facing an increased risk on the basis of a chosen social identity towhich they aremorally entitled, orwhich
is central to valuable exercise of their autonomy (e.g. religion). So if G is the sort of property that individuals
cannot avoid having, or that they ought to be free to have without facing extra risks of p-based error, there is a
high cost of error associated with using statistics drawn from theG-class as evidence for p. WhenG is avoidable,
or is not a moral entitlement (gang membership, wearing a uniform, etc.), the cost of error is less severe. The
original prison yard case takes presence in the yard as the class-defining property; this is not identity-tracking,
but if the prisoners’ movements are controlled such that they cannot leave the yard at will, it is not avoidable,
either.
The more stable or enduring the reference class, the more relying on it will concentrate the risk-exposure.
So, the more difficult or costly it is for individuals to leave the reference group (by no longer having G), and the
more often that group is used in judgments of a p-type, the greater the burden of the risk imposed, and hence the
greater the moral wrong done in imposing it. Conversely, generalizations that draw on fragile or ad-hoc groups
(e.g. the set of individuals matching a very specific eye-witness description) tend not to repeatedly subject the
same set of members to risk of error, and so are easier to justify using, than generalizations that draw on more
stable social categories. Less specific eye-witness descriptions are more complicated; I will return to them at the
end of §3.
All else equal, then, it will often be a bit more difficult to achieve practical adequacy when relying on actu-
arial evidence. But often ‘all else’ is not equal: the forms of evidence that are paradigmatically individualized—
confessions, observed behavior, and eye-witness testimony—also can have a stakes-lowering effect, and so make
it easier to achieve practical adequacy. To see this, consider a third variant of the prison yard case. Holding
fixed that Alex is actually innocent, imagine that he freely submits a signed confession to participating in the as-
sault. It no longer seems that he can legitimately complain against our concluding that he is guilty, given that he
told us that he is. This holds even though Alex suffers some costs from being mistakenly treated as guilty.17 The
best explanation is that something like Responsible ClaimMitigation is true: in asserting that p, Alex undermines
17It is important here that the confession be freely given; it is likely that confessions obtained in coercive or intimidating plea-bargain contexts
will not have the same effect.
Explaining Evidential Asymmetries 9
his complaint against the risk of our making a p-based error.18
Responsible claim mitigation– A’s responsible performance of an avoidable behavior b with the meaning that
p mitigates A’s complaint against S’s settling that p, and hence weakens A’s complaint against the costs of a
p-based error.
I contend that agents’ moral complaints against suffering the costs of a p-based mistake are mitigated when
they avoidably and responsibly supply the evidence that grounds the error. If something of this sort is true, we
might get a scale of avoidable behaviors that are variously strong evidence for guilt, that the agent can bemorally
expected to avoid performing, when innocent. Direct observation of such behavior has a stronger effect than
testimony from an eyewitness to such behavior, but perhaps both function to lessen the agent’s complaint against
the risk of false conviction. To the extent that our judgment whether p rests of evidence of this kind, it is easier
to achieve practical adequacy, because the wrongs risked are less weighty.
Depending on what accounts for the fact that the eyewitness in prison yard-(b) is 85% reliable, her testi-
mony most likely either distributes the remaining 15% chance of error across an ad-hoc class of prisoners—the
class of people who look like the actual attacker—or randomly. Either way, the imposition is a one-time risk
that is not disproportionately concentrated. In that the evidence is testimony about Alex’s behavior, it’s plausi-
bly somewhere on our scale of evidence that weakens, or at the very least does not strengthen, Alex’s complaint
against the risk of false conviction. So, we can expect that the stakes for justifying conviction are at least not
raised by reliance on this evidence, andmight be lowered.
The net effect is that there is a marked asymmetry between the standards for adequate justification to settle
that p in cases like prison yard-a than in cases like prison yard-b, so even if the evidential probability of p in
the former was slightly higher, it might fail to clear the demanding a-case threshold, while the latter easily clears
the less demanding b-case threshold.
3 Justifying Exclusion
If all I’ve said so far is true, we can expect that purely actuarial inferences will rarely satisfy the rational set-
tling constraint, and so we should expect asymmetries of the kind on display in the prison yard case pair.
But this does not yet justify excluding actuarial evidence from consideration at trials. For that, we will need to
invoke moral reasons—but here they are appropriate. I take it that Tillers’ complaint is not against the relevance
of moral reasons as such, but rather against their inappropriately distorting our epistemic practices.
All rational agentsmust adopt practices to balance competing epistemic goals: believe truths and avoid believ-
ing falsehoods. But even if individuals are free to decide for themselves how tomake these tradeoffs, institutional
finders of fact are not. The purpose of the legal apparatus is to help fulfill the state’s obligation to enforce and
protect the rights of its members. Its governing policies must facilitate justice, not only narrowly in the out-
come of a given case, but more broadly in each member’s overall risk of suffering either of two bad outcomes:
(i) a violation of their rights, or (ii) a false finding of guilt/liability. Decisions about the epistemic policies of
18Theoperation of the principle does not seem limited to explicit speech acts. What it tracks instead is something like responsible performance
of avoidable behaviors, where something counts as avoidable if it is not costly, in some normatively laden sense, for the agent to avoid. In
determining whether avoidance is costly, we should discount costs the agent is liable to bear, but count as costs any sacrifices of moral
entitlements, and arbitrary or disproportionate restrictions on overall freedom, as well as expenditures of resources or effort.
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this institutional agent–most obviously, identification of burdens and standards of proof–must be selected with
reference to this goal. If the standards are too high, or too much evidence is excluded, then the expectation of
escaping responsibility for one’s crimes will be too high, and members will not be adequately secured against
suffering violations. If the standards are too low, then they face too high a risk of being falsely convicted or found
liable. Similarly, justice demands that the policies be crafted in a way that distributes the remaining risks fairly
among the members. Schauer and Tillers’ objection overlooks this point: when crafting the epistemic norms
for the court, we cannot look only to maximize our accuracy in a given ruling, or even across a long stretch of
rulings. We are also obligated to look at how our policies will affect the distribution of the errors we do make.
If an evidence rule concentrates the risk of suffering false findings on a subgroup of the population, in a way in-
sensitive to their choices, members of that group have a justice-based complaint against the rule proportionate
to the severity and concentration of the risk.
This is because even group members who do not themselves suffer mistaken findings are harmed by dis-
proportionate risk impositions of this kind.19 The knowledge that they face disproportionately high risk of
being found guilty or liable, if they face a trial, can be expected to have a number of harmful effects. First,
simply being aware that one faces higher risks can take a psychological toll, affecting the agent’s overall welfare
and well-being. Second, when the costs associated with the risk are especially high—high fines, a conviction,
detainment—disproportionate exposure can lead agents to engage in a wide array of costly behavior to pro-
tect themselves from the harm, or to constrain their actions in various cost-incurring ways in order to reduce
their risk exposure. These effects of risk exposure are compounded by repeated, sustained, or patterned impo-
sition. The more stable, visible, and identity-tracking a property G is, the more actuarial inferences based on
G-membership will concentrate risk.
If G is a property that scores highly on these measures, an evidential policy that permits actuarial inferences
based on G to count as evidence of guilt can be expected to influence G-members to act to minimize their risk of
ever facing trial: avoiding contact with law enforcement or government agencies, avoiding public spaces where
othersmight find their presence ‘suspicious’, etc. These behaviors are costly to the individuals as well as being bad
over the long term for the polity.20 So, we have particularly strong reason to bar reliance on actuarial inferences
based on visible, identity tracking properties (race, gender, religion, orientation). If they were highly probative
evidence, or if excluding them could be expected to significantly increase the incidence of errors, this might be a
significant sacrifice requiring political deliberation. But, as we have just seen, actuarial inference especially based
on these groups can be expected to generally be of minimal probative value.
Tillers is right, however, that this moral/political motivation for exclusion neither affects all actuarial infer-
ence, nor only actuarial inferences. This is one of the strengths of the explanation I have offered; the nuanced
verdicts it yields about which forms of evidence should be eschewed explain some intuitive verdicts that are dif-
ficult for a simpler account (like statistics deficiency) to accommodate. For instance, some find the prison
19There is some controversy over whether ‘pure risks’–which do not eventuate in harms, and never come to A’s attention–wrong A, but we
can safely set this controversy aside. Our inquiry concerns whether we should adopt a policy of allowing legal convictions on the basis of
statistical evidence, and evidential policies of this kind are public. It’s therefore plausible that if we do adopt such a policy, the members
of groups which thereby become more likely to be convicted for certain offenses may be aware of their increased risk. So, the sorts of risk
impositions relevant to our discussion are ‘impure’, and can be counted as wrongs even if pure risks are not.
20Brayne (2017) details some of these behaviors among ethnic groups that are subject to disproportionate police scrutiny.
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yard-a case unproblematic, but would object if the statistical evidence invoked a racial or ethnic group rather
than just the set of prisoners in the yard. The view I have sketched readily explains this pattern of judgments:
if the group invoked by an actuarial inference is highly accidental or strongly choice-sensitive, the members
will not have a weighty complaint against the risk imposed. So, to the extent that we take presence in the yard
to be strongly choice-sensitive and accidental, we should be less bothered by basing inferences on this prop-
erty. Conversely, and more interestingly, if individualized evidence like eyewitness testimony has a biased error
distribution against a relatively stable group—e.g. makes false-positive identifications disproportionately often
against black men—then members of that group have a justice-based complaint against relying on this form of
evidence, proportionate in force to the bias of the error rate.21
The judicial system should be the just and fair way to collectively deliberate about and enforce public law. If
the risks of suffering a miscarriage are not fairly distributed—either randomly or following choice in justifiable
ways—then the system is not fulfilling its aims. What this highlights is that considerations centered on the
particular individual on trial do not exhaust themoral difference between actuarial and individualized evidence.
There is, then, an appropriate role for moral and political reasons in shaping our evidential policies, and, in these
cases, following their prescription comes at no epistemic cost.
4 Wrapping up
The explanation that I have outlined abandons simple-probabilism: it denies that statistical generalizations
are straightforwardly equivalent to equally probabilifying individualized evidence in justificatory force. But it
does not commit to statistics-deficiency: it does not claim that there is a deep defect in actuarial inference
as a class, and so escapes needing to provide a principled characterization of that class. Nor does it claim that
evidence must be an appropriate basis for believing p, or yield knowledge that p, in order to justify issuing a
legal verdict that p. Instead, I claim that the asymmetry arises from the fact that legal judgments are subject to
the rational settling constraint, so whether evidence e is sufficient for settling that p depends on three factors: (i)
how probable e makes p, (ii) how certain we are that future evidence won’t significantly lower that probability
(resilience), and (iii) what the expected costs are if we’re mistaken whether p (practical adequacy). Population-
level generalizations are a less resilient basis for credence than paradigmatically individualized information.
They also have a harder time rendering agents practically adequate, because relying on reference-class based
evidence raises the stakes by imposing a risk on other members of the class (which is weightier the more stable
the class is, and the less random its membership).
My arguments suggest a framework for explaining the relevance of moral considerations to legal rules of
evidence; it is not just wishful thinking, pretending the world were fairer and population-level facts didn’t sup-
port certain probabilistic judgments. Rather, it emphasizes each individual’s entitlement to a fair procedure and
attends to how various evidential policies operate over time to shape our error propensities, taking these and
not just the overall probability of errors to be relevant to agents’ complaints. This is more nuanced, or at least
more articulated at a couple of points, than statistics deficiency. While it does acknowledge the importance
of moral and political considerations in the framing of legal evidence rules, the explanation I offer makes clear
how and when these factors are epistemically relevant.
21Thank Jessica Kieser and Katie Steele for this worry.
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